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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
TED R. BROWN and WARREN B. 
BROWN, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
I 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does an owner of land abutting a City street acquire vested property rights 
of access to all of the parking spaces on the abutting owner's property? 
2. Can the City alter the use of its streets to meet reasonable police power 
objective by redesigning the street and changing the space allocated for vehicle or 
pedestrian traffic and thus changing the access to abutting property? 
3. Must the City compensate an abutting owner for the changed use of City 
streets when no property is taken from the property owner and the property owner still 
retains reasonable access to his abutting property? 
Case No. 87-0127 CA 
(Former Supreme 
Court No. 87-0011) 
n 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Section 78-12-13, Utah Code Ann.. 1953, as amended: 
Adverse Possession of Public Streets or Ways. No person shall be 
allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by any . . . city 
. . . designated for public use as streets . . . by adverse possession thereof 
for any length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that 
such . . . city . . . sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real 
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more than 
seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or 
successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse 
possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may be 
acquired. 
m 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
IV 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiffs' Complaint seeks damages from Salt Lake City Corporation ("the 
City") because the City, in changing the layout of a City street, removed access to certain 
parking spaces on the plaintiffs property. 
V 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The plaintiffs styled their original Complaint in "inverse condemnation". 
Subsequent to a Motion from the City concerning governmental immunity defenses, the 
plaintiffs added a second claim of action for "damages" based o»n the same facts. 
Upon conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, the trial court granted the City's Motion 
to Dismiss. In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and from the Bench, Judge 
Daniels ruled that private citizens do not acquire any particular right to use any particular 
part of the roadway to get on or off their property. All that is required is that property 
owners are entitled to reasonable access to their property. So long as that access to the 
property is provided, the City can exercise its discretion and alter the configuration and 
use of the public streets pursuant to the police power. If access is provided, and, as here, 
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no property of the abutting landowner is taken, the City is not required to pay 
compensation for activities on its own property. (R. 232-33, 126-129.) 
Judge Daniels further found that reasonable access to the plaintiffs' property had 
been provided by curb cuts and that no portion of the plaintiffs' property had been 
physically taken. (R. 127.) The plaintiffs filed and lost a Motion for New Trial. This 
appeal resulted. 
VI 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below, 
demonstrate: 
1. In the summer of 1983, the City began a Special Improvement District 
project on 1300 South Street, in part, in response to the flood which occurred in the 
spring. As part of the project, the City acquired frontage from various property owners 
abutting 1300 South. The City made an offer to the plaintiffs to acquire part of their 
property. (R. 271.) The offer was not accepted because the plaintiffs believed they had 
some right to be compensated for the loss of use of certain parking spaces which were 
accessed from the City street by driving over a sidewalk and backing into traffic. (R. 
271,466,486 and 525.) 
2* The City never accepted the plaintiffs' position that they were entitled to 
compensation for damages for the loss of the parking. The City did offer to pay 
reasonable compensation for any of the plaintiffs' actual property which might be taken. 
However, none of the plaintiffs' property was ever taken. (R. 466,486 and 525.) 
3. After the project was completed, the plaintiffs still had reasonable 
physical access to their property. (R. 487, 433; Exhibits D-19, D-25 and D-30, copies of 
these photographs are attached as Exhibit A to this Brief for the convenience of the 
Court.) 
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4, The City's actions on its own property, viz. the public street, simply 
changed the parking in front of the plaintiffs' properties from angle parking accessible by 
driving over a sidewalk to parallel parking accessible through curb cuts. (Exhibits D-19, 
D-25andD-30.)i 
VII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is not a case in inverse condemnation. Instead, it is a case where the 
plaintiffs claim damages for the extinguishment of what they claim to be an easement on 
City property. They claim that easement is for access parking stalls habitually used by 
the public, including their business customers. They mistake the legal requirement of 
"access to their property" for that of "access to parking stalls." 
The case law and statutes in Utah are clear. First, the City owns its streets from 
property line to property line and can take whatever actions are reasonably necessary on 
them in exercise of the police power. The City can alter the configuration, width, 
parking, speed limit and any other aspect of the streets' use. The only limiting factor to 
the City's police power use of its own streets is that reasonable access to abutting 
properties cannot be denied without compensation. This access means access to the 
owners' property, riot to each and every parking space abutting the City owned street. 
iThe plaintiffs spend approximately one-third of their brief arguing about Findings of Fact which Judge 
Daniels refused to make. The standard in Utah for reviewing the trial court's refusal to make Findings is 
set forth in De Vas v. Noble. 13 Utah 2d 138,369 P.2d 290,293 (1962); cert, den'd 371 U.S. 821 (1963): 
In order to compel such a finding, it is necessary that the evidence concerning the fact in 
question not only be of sufficient quality in substance to support a finding that it is true, 
but it must go beyond that and be such that all reasonable minds would so conclude. On 
the other hand, if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence, or lack of evidence, from 
which reasonable minds could honestly say they were not convinced of such facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then the ruling of the trial court should be sustained. 
(Citations omitted.) 
None of the requested Findings of the plaintiffs meet this strict standard. Moreover, these 
requested Findings do not disturb the trial court's correct interpretation of the basic law that the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to any damages because none of their property rights were taken. Requested Findings Nos. 
6, 9, 11 and 12 simply go to the existence of access to parking spaces wholly from the City street. 
Requested Findings Nos. 10 and 13 (R.132-134) go to actual physical access to plaintiffs' property. And 
requested Finding No. 14 goes to a separate damage element concerning draining. 
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Additionally, it is clear that no abutting property owner can acquire an interest in 
the City streets beyond the requirement of access. Since no interest can be acquired, 
there can be no basis for compensation as long as access is provided. Any damages 
caused by reasonable police power actions, assuming access is still provided to the 
property, are non-compensable. 
Vffl 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiffs allege an action styled in "inverse condemnation"^ They also make 
a claim that, assuming their "inverse condemnation" case is barred by governmental 
immunity, they are nonetheless entitled to damages for the City's alteration of the street. 
Essentially, the plaintiffs claim that each of the parking spaces on their property in front 
of their buildings was a "separate right of access" to their property and that the City, by 
changing the use of the street, condemned an easement for ingress and egress which the 
plaintiffs had to these parking spaces (Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss, R. 37-39). 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE PUBLIC PARKING SPACES 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that City streets extend from 
property line to property line and that cities, in the exercise of their police power, have 
the right to designate which portions of the street shall be used for vehicular and 
pedestrian traffic. Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, P.2d (Utah 
1987); Standard Optical v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 535 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1975). 
Section 78-12-13, U.C.A., quoted above, clearly establishes that the plaintiffs could not 
have obtained an easement or any other right of ownership in the public street. There 
2Given the existence of the plaintiffs' cause of action for damages based on the same factual situation, it is 
not necessary for this Court to decide in this case whether inverse condemnation is recognized in Utah. 
That proposition has never been settled. See, e.g., Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975). 
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was not a scintilla of evidence presented at trial showing that any of the elements of 
Section 78-12-13 were met; i.e., 1) that the City sold or disposed of an easement to the 
parking spaces; 2) that valuable consideration was paid for the parking access easement; 
nor 3) that any non-existent purchaser had exclusively, continuously and adversely 
possessed the parking space access easement for seven years. The most the plaintiffs can 
argue is that the parking spaces were shown in some long lost building plans. This is not 
enough, under the statute, to establish ownership. 
The City never intended, and never did, comply with the provisions for disposing 
of portions of the street right of way set forth in §10-8-8.2, U.C.A. The Supreme Court 
has held that these provisions governing transfer of public property must be strictly 
complied with in order to effect valid conveyances. Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 
1268 (Utah 1982); Tooele Citv v. Elkington. 100 Utah 485, 116 R2d 406 (1941). 
There is no question that the plaintiffs are entitled to a right of access to their 
property and that this right is considered an easement which cannot be taken without 
compensation. Hampton v. State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 
(1968). However, the case law in Utah and across the country makes it clear that the 
plaintiffs cannot insist on any particular use of the City owned streets or any particular 
access. In Utah State Road Commission v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926 at 928 (Utah 1974), this 
Court held: 
A property owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of 
traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow 
does not entitle the owner to compensation. Thus, no private property 
right is taken by the construction of a median divider, since the abutting 
owner has no property right in the free flow of traffic past his place of 
business. 
Since the property owner has no right to insist on free flowing traffic, it is 
axiomatic that the owner has no right to insist on the opposite of free flowing traffic, viz. 
access to parking stalls. 
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In Hampton, supra, at 711, the Supreme Court cited State Ex rel. State Highway 
Commission v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 857, 859-60 (Mo. 1965) concerning limitations 
on the rights of access: 
Nevertheless, the cases point out that this right is subject to certain well-
recognized limitations and exclusions. One of these limitations is that the 
right of ingress and egress does not extend to every foot of the 
condemnee's frontage, but under the police power of the state, the right 
may be limited to reasonable access under the existing facts and 
circumstances. (Emphasis added.) 
In Walton v. State, Road Commission, 558 P.2d 609, 610 (Utah 1976), the 
Supreme Court held that compensation for limitation of access was not required "where 
access [to the property] was not impossible". (Emphasis added.) 
"Inverse condemnation" as a remedy for loss of access to parking stalls adjacent 
to City streets has been rejected in Snvder v. State, 438 P.2d 920 (Idaho 1968). In that 
case, the Idaho Highway Department decided to change the use of a street to 
accommodate increased flows of traffic. In doing so, it determined to prohibit street side 
parking on abutting property to reduce the possible hazards caused by such parking. To 
do this, the City removed a curb cut on the City street which had been used to provide 
access to plaintiffs property. In denying the claim, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
[Respondent [plaintiff] would have this court equate the right of vehicular 
access on to his property with the elimination of parking along the public 
thoroughfare in order to uphold his claim for compensable damages. We 
hold that respondent is in no better position than was the taxicab owner in 
Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d 
681 [,684] (1948), where this court stated: 
»»* * * the City, in the exercise of its police power, can 
revoke such license [permit to park on the public streets for 
a business purpose] if the particular thing permitted is or 
becomes a public nuisance, or such revocation is necessary 
and in the interests of the public welfare or public safety, 
and is not arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, 
oppressive or capricious, and the conditions existing at the 
same time justify such action." [Citations omitted.] 
In the instant case, the trial court found that the curb cuts put in for the plaintiffs' 
property provided the required access to the plaintiffs' property. (R. 128.) On review, 
this finding will not be overturned by this Court, if it is supported by the evidence. Shioji 
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v. Shioji. 717 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Sharpe v. American Medical Systems. Inc., 671 
P.2d 185 (Utah 1983). 
The plaintiffs have not even bothered to substantially argue, in their Brief before 
this Court, that they do not have actual reasonable access to their own property. The 
record is more than sufficient to establish that Judge Daniels' Findings on this issue were 
adequately supported by the evidence. (R. 487 and 533, Exhibits D-19, D-25 and D-30 
attached as Exhibit A to this Brief.) As the plaintiffs do not have any "easement" rights 
of access to the parking spaces and still have reasonable access to their own property, 
there has been no "taking" by the City requiring compensation. 
POINT H 
THE PLAINTIFFS' "DAMAGES" FOR THE CITY'S POLICE 
POWER ALTERATION OF ITS STREETS ARE 
"DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA" 
The plaintiffs' second theory of recovery against the City argues that even if there 
has been no "taking", as conclusively demonstrated above, still the plaintiffs have been 
"damaged" by the City's actions. For the purpose of this Brief, it is not relevant whether 
or not the City's actions damaged the plaintiffs' property. The question instead is 
whether the plaintiffs have any right of recovery for such damages. The Supreme Court, 
in Hampton, supra, at 711, again quoting Meier, supra, stated the general rule: 
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include 
any right in and to the existing public traffic on the highway, or any right 
to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property. The reason is that all 
traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of the state, 
and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the 
way of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion 
of traffic the state and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of 
property values by reason of such diversion of traffic, because such 
damages are "damnum absque injuria", or without legal injury. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This principle is so well settled in Utah that the Supreme Court has stopped even 
bothering to discuss the merits of the position. In Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 
30 Utah 2d 4,511 P.2d 1286-87 (1973), this Court held: 
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There is no taking of property involved in this action. The law has long 
been established in this state that under those circumstances there can be 
no recovery from the state for damages because the construction of a 
highway may impair or adversely affect the convenience of access to the 
property Sufficient has been said as to the pro and con of this subject that 
we think it unnecessary and undesirable to extenuate thereon, but refer to 
the adjudicated cases. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) 
The "adjudicated cases" referred to in Holt include Springville Banking Co. v. 
Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157,159, where the Supreme Court held: 
Access has not been denied. Interfered with, it is true, but in our opinion 
to no unreasonable extent. Southbound travelers seeking plaintiffs 
property have to travel but a quarter mile further to reach it. The island 
concededly was necessary and desirable for safety reasons and to effect 
traffic control. This case more nearly is akin to Robinett v. Price [74 Utah 
512, 280 P. 736 (1929)] where we held a much more circuitous route gave 
rise to no claim for damages where one end of a road was closed. 
If every abutter on a highway or street where proper authority reasonably 
has eliminated left or U-turns, could obtain damages incident to such 
eventuality, the result is obvious: Highways would remain unmarked 
because of the prohibitive cost involved in payment of damages to owners 
on both sides . . . . Highways would become increasingly more 
dangerous, what with the rapidly increased traffic that has evolved in the 
past years and which clearly will increase further. Thousands of miles of 
highway would be left with no traffic control. No city could afford the 
luxury of a one way street lest it was of that type in the inception. 
Exigencies of the times require a practical, sensible approach to the 
limited-access highway problem, with the general public good being the 
primary consideration in determining each case as it arises, each case 
being different. 
We believe, conclude and hold that the plaintiff here had no cause of 
action by way mandamus, and that any damage provable here must yield 
without compensation in view of the obvious and admitted necessity for 
dividing the subject highway in this case. (Emphasis added, footnotes 
omitted.) 
By way of analogy, under the plaintiffs' theory in this case, no city could ever 
alter access to parking spaces on abutting property, without compensating the abutting 
property owners. Cities could not require changing from angle to parallel parking; could 
not beautify the streets by inserting landscaping features in former parking spaces; could 
not determine that safety reasons required removal of parking spaces; could not change 
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access to parking spaces for mass transit usage, nor make any other alteration of the 
parking spaces without paying compensation^ 
Damage claims for loss of access to parking have consistently been rejected 
across the country. Under almost identical facts, concerning the construction of a high 
curb near the plaintiff's property which cut off access all along the property line, the loss 
of access to parking stalls was held to be non-compensable in Johnson v. Burke County. 
101 Ga. App. 747, 115 S.E.2d 484 (1960). In City of Phoenix v. Ward, 5 Ariz. App. 505, 
428 P.2d 450,453 (1967), parking alongside a highway was totally prohibited as a result 
of a highway construction project and the court held that damages were non-
compensable. A similar result occurred in Citv of Orlando v. Cullom. 400 So.2d 513 
(Ha. App. 1981) where the City of Orlando changed an entire street into a pedestrian 
mall, thus removing all parking, which the court nonetheless found non-compensable. In 
Yegen v. Citv of Bismark. 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980), a street improvement project 
which took away parking rights was again held non-compensable. See also, Snyder, 
supra. 
The plaintiffs cite Keiffer v. King County. 89 Wash.2d 369, 572 P.2d 408 (1977) 
in support of their claim for damages. As shown above, Keiffer is a minority of one as to 
its conclusion. Further, Keiffer is distinguishable on its facts given that Judge Daniels 
specifically found that the two curb cuts in the instant case provided access to the 
plaintiffs' property. (See R.127 and Exhibits D-19, D-25 and D-30 attached as Exhibit 
A.) 
3The plaintiffs' Brief, at p. 40, also discusses Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State. Road Commission, 
533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975). The plaintiffs argue that Bailey did not discuss the "damage" issue as opposed 
to the "taking" issue. However, even the portion of Bailey cited by the plaintiffs clearly precludes the 
plaintiffs' "damage" recovery in the instant case: 
Prior decisions of this court have established the principle that there can be no recovery 
from the state for damages where the construction of the highway or the erection of 
structures within the public right-of-way impair or adversely affect the convenience of 
access to the property of an abutting owner. Bailey, supra, at 883. (Emphasis added.) 
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The plaintiffs' argument for "damages", as opposed to "taking" is thus not 
supported by well established Utah case law. Convenience of access, either free flowing 
traffic or parking spaces, is a legitimate police power exercise of the City. Any 
incidental damages caused by the alteration of such incidental benefits is non-
compensable under the principle of damnum absque injuria just as the City never 
attempts to charge the property owners for any benefits incidently created by police 
power activities. 
K 
CONCLUSION 
No property of the plaintiffs was taken by the City. Their easement of access to 
their property was adequately protected by the curb cuts. They have no constitutional, 
statutory or other legal right to an "easement" to the parking spaces. The only easement 
they do have was for access to their own property and this was adequately protected. 
Further, any damages suffered as a result of reasonable police power activities 
regulating the use of the street are without remedy. The benefits and burdens of street 
activities relate to the public in general and are not compensable to private property 
owners in particular. 
Respectfully submitted this?£r day of April, 1987. ~ 
ROGER F. CUTLER, Salt Lake 
City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
I ^ $ # C E R. BJ$KD, Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Defendant/Respondent was served on 
the plaintiffs/appellants this 20th day of April, 1987, by mailing two (2) true and correct 
copies thereof via United States Mail, with postage prepaid tliereon, to Richard L. Bird, 
Jr., Esq., Richards, Bird & Kump, Attorneys at Law, 333 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, attorneys for plaintiffs/appellants. 
BRB:ppl347a 
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